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Abstract
This paper studies optimal managerial contracts in two contracting environments. When
contracts can be based on earnings, an optimal contract is interpreted as a combination of
base salary, golden parachute and bonus. When earnings are not veriﬁable, two types of
optimal contracts are derived: a contract with restricted stock ownership, and a contract with
stock options. These three types of optimal contracts are payoﬀ-equivalent in a strong sense:
agents’ ex ante and ex post payoﬀs are the same under all three contracts, implying that the
choice of contractual form is irrelevant in the environment studied in this paper. This paper
thus suggests directions of research for the relevance of diﬀerent contractual forms.
KEY WORDS: Optimal contract, executive compensation, bonus, golden parachutes, stock
ownership, stock options.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D82, G32, J33.1. Introduction
For some time, the magnitude of compensation for corporations’ chief executive oﬃcers
(CEOs) has spawned heated debate among academics and the public alike.(1) While public
outcry regarding the astronomical ﬁgures may still exist, it seems that the debate has waned at
least among academics. Academic interests in CEO compensation have taken diﬀerent turns.
Some of the major issues now are the discrepancy between theory and practice, and the way
CEOs ought to be paid.
The main point regarding the ﬁrst issue is how economic theory of contract fails to explain
the small pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. While there is no consensus
whether the empirical pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation is as prescribed
by the principal-agent theory,(2) there is convincing evidence that incentive eﬀects of stock
options or stock ownership far outweigh those of cash compensation. For example, Jensen and
Murphy (1990a) report that the pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs represented by stock
options is more than 30 times than that by cash compensation. Hall and Liebman (1998) ﬁnd
that a strong positive relationship between ﬁrm performance and CEO compensation is mostly
due to CEO holdings of stocks and stock options, with the incentive eﬀects from stock and
stock option revaluations being 53 times larger than those from salary and bonus changes.
This paper is mainly concerned with the second issue. In particular, we are interested in
two questions. First, why are incentives to executives provided more and more through stocks
and stock options rather than through conventional bonus?(3) In addressing this question, we
take the opposite direction and identify an environment in which diﬀerent incentive schemes
can generate the same incentives. This enables us to identify a host of factors that are likely
(1) See, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990b), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Ch. 13 or Murphy (1999)
and various references therein.
(2) Initial debate started with a seminal article by Jensen and Murphy (1990a). The low pay-performance
sensitivity reported by Jensen and Murphy was explained by a parametrized principal-agent model by Haubrich
(1994). Instead of using the level of executive compensation, Garen (1994), and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)
used the comparative static predictions of principal-agent model to explain the variations in pay-performance
sensitivity across the cross section of ﬁrms. Hadlock and Lumer (1997), and Holderness et al. (1999) provide
historical evidence on executive compensation. Using proxies for incentive eﬀects of executive stock options,
Hall and Liebman (1998), and Hall (1998) provide evidence for strong pay-performance sensitivity. For a survey,
see Murphy (1999).
(3) This is most prominent in the US although the increasing use of stock options to motivate CEOs is highly
visible in other industrialized economies as well. See Murphy (1999) for example.
1determinants of this changing trend. Second, what is the nature of relationship among various
components that comprise a CEO compensation package? A typical CEO compensation pack-
age for large US corporations comprises cash salary and bonus, stock ownership, stock options
and a provision for severance payment.(4) Clearly these components are interrelated in moti-
vating CEOs to act in the interests of shareholders. For example, the severance payment, or
golden parachutes, is intended to induce the CEO to make proper decisions based on available
information and not to distort the running of the ﬁrm to ﬁght takeover bids. The opportunity
cost for the CEO in taking this course of action is the compensation from continuation of ap-
pointment that might be lost after the takeover. It thus follows that golden parachutes should
reﬂect this opportunity cost.
This paper studies a parsimonious model in which the components of CEO compensation
package mentioned above can be introduced most naturally. The simple three-period model we
study has two economic agents one of whom is called the owner and the other, the manager.
The owner has an investment project and capital to ﬁnance it, but only the manager has the
expertise to assess the proﬁtability of the project. Initially, the owner hires a manager who then
privately studies the proﬁtability, which is modelled as the process of information acquisition.
In period 2, the manager decides whether or not to undertake the project, or equivalently, the
owner decides based on the report by the manager. If the project is aborted, then the manager
leaves at a severance payment. If the project is undertaken, the return is realized and publicly
observed in period 3, based on which the manager is paid.
We study two environments and derive optimal contracts. First, if the return is veriﬁable
also so that the initial contract can be based on the return, then the optimal contract is
interpreted as a combination of golden parachute (payment at period 2 to the leaving manager),
base salary and bonus (payment at period 3). In the second environment, we assume that the
return is not veriﬁable, hence cannot be contracted upon. Nonetheless, it is publicly observable,
and is reﬂected in the ‘price’ of the project. In this case, we derive two types of optimal
contracts: a contract with stock ownership that is restricted to be traded only at date 3, and a
(4) For more details on executive compensation in practice, see, for example, Kole (1997) or Murphy (1999)
for a variety of incentive compensation plans adopted by US corporations. From a sample of 446 ﬁrms that
appeared on the Forbes magazine list of the largest US ﬁrms in 1987, Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) ﬁnd that
the CEOs of 51 percent of these ﬁrms had golden parachutes (a severance agreement granting cash and other
beneﬁts if the CEO is ﬁred, demoted, or resigns within a certain time period following the change in control).
2contract with stock options. These three types of optimal contracts are payoﬀ-equivalent in a
strong sense: managers’ ex ante and ex post payoﬀs are the same under all three contracts. The
intuition is simple. Insofar as the market correctly expects the investment decision implied by
the managerial contract, which is impounded in the price of the project along with ﬁrm-level
information that is observed noise-free, it is irrelevant whether incentives are provided based
on ﬁrm-level information or market-based information. Or course, such irrelevance is subject
to a requirement that the manager’s trading in stocks or options be optimally timed. The
paper thus shows how diﬀerent types of contracts can replicate exactly the same incentives as
long as they are designed optimally.
At ﬁrst sight, one might think that the result of this paper is more negative than positive.
A strong message from the paper, for example, is the irrelevance of using diﬀerent forms of
contracts as long as they are designed optimally. Accordingly, the question of why a certain
type of contract is used more often than others remains unanswered. In the spirit similar to
Modigliani and Miller propositions, what the result of this paper is pointing at is not so much
the irrelevance of diﬀerent forms of contracts per se, but rather the conditions that would make
the question of relevance meaningful. For example, special features of the simple model studied
in this paper include risk neutrality of managers, dichotomous and bulky investment, absence
of moral hazard from other employees, absence of earnings manipulation by managers, perfect
observability of earnings by markets, and eﬃcient stock markets where public information is
reﬂected perfectly in stock prices. Thus, a message from this paper is that the question of
relevance is meaningful when one or more of these conditions are relaxed. In the concluding
section of this paper, we discuss how the irrelevance result of this paper is likely to change
when these conditions are relaxed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes a basic model. Section 4 studies an optimal contract in an environment
where the return from the project is veriﬁable. Section 5 is concerned with a contracting
environment where the return from the project is not veriﬁable. Two types of optimal contracts
are derived: a contract with restricted stock ownership, and a contract with stock options.
Section 6 summarizes the main results of the paper and discusses possible extensions of the
model. Proofs not provided in the main text are all relegated to the appendix.
32. Related Literature
This paper overlaps with several strands of literature in accounting, economics and ﬁnance.
A bulk of papers in accounting have been concerned with the incentive aspect of managerial
contracts based on either reported accounting earnings or stock price. Some examples are
Bushman and Indjejikian (1993), Kim and Suh (1993), Sloan (1993), and Baiman and Ver-
recchia (1995) on the analysis of optimal contract, and Healy (1985) with numerous follow-up
empirical studies on the possibility of earnings manipulation by managers when their bonus
plan is based on accounting earnings. Depending on how private information is impounded
in stock price, the ﬁrst set of studies typically analyzes an optimal contract that is linear in
earnings report and stock price. The linearity of an optimal contract rests on the normality of
relevant random variables, and is justiﬁed in line with Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987). Paul
(1992), and Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993) study the optimality of linear stock-based contracts
when the market’s observation of ﬁrm-level information is not perfect. The present paper
diﬀers from these studies in providing a broad benchmark for the irrelevance of contractual
forms, including contracts with stock ownership and stock options. As a consequence, we
contend that elements such as information content of earnings or the possibility of earnings
manipulation are but a few of many that could make the question of relevance meaningful.
The second strand of literature related to the present study is that on golden parachutes.
Positive explanations for the use of golden parachutes oﬀered previously include incentive
alignment eﬀect by Lambert and Larcker (1985), deferred payment eﬀect by Knoeber (1986),
bargaining advantage eﬀect by Harris (1990), and commitment eﬀect by Cyert and Kumar
(1996) and Choe (1998).(5) While the explanation provided in this paper is similar to those in
Lambert and Larcker, and Choe, an additional insight is oﬀered as to how golden parachutes
are related to other components of CEO compensation package. In a simpliﬁed model of this
paper, the size of golden parachute is the same regardless of whether performance incentives
are provided through bonus, stock ownership or stock options.
Finally, the second half of this paper can be viewed as an application of incomplete contract
(5) For empirical evidence on the relationships between the adoption of golden parachutes, stock price
reactions, and the incidence of takeovers, see Walking and Long (1984), Lambert and Larcker (1985), Agrawal
and Knoeber (1998), and Narayanan and Sundaram (1998).
4theory to executive compensation. The single most important focus of incomplete contract
theory has been on the resolution of holdup problem: the problem of underinvestment due
to the incompleteness of contracts and the speciﬁcity of investment (Williamson, 1985; Hart
and Moore, 1988).(6) There is now extensive literature concerned with overcoming the holdup
problem by adding option-like features to the initial contract,(7) or by allowing renegotiation.(8)
Incomplete contracting approach has also been applied to explain the use of ﬁnancial contracts
diﬀerent from standard debt or equity (Aghion and Bolton, 1992), or the stage ﬁnancing feature
of venture capital contracts (Repullo and Suarez, 1999). In a sense, this paper is also concerned
with the resolution of holdup problem: the manager can learn the proﬁtability of project at
private cost, which cannot be directly contracted upon. Apart from the applied nature of
questions addressed, this paper oﬀers another solution to the holdup problem diﬀerent from
option-like features or simple contract combined with renegotiation possibility. That is, when
the ownership rights can be traded in a market which correctly reﬂects public information in
the price of ownership, then ownership itself can solve the holdup problem.
3. Information Acquisition and Optimal Investment Decision
The model has a representative shareholder called the owner and a continuum of ex ante
identical managers. The owner is identiﬁed with a ﬁnancier who has an investment project.
However, only managers have expertise to assess the proﬁtability of the project, and if it is
found positive, to implement the project. The project requires an outlay K, and returns πg
in a good state (G) to be called ‘success’, and πb in a bad state (B) to be called ‘failure’,
with πg > K > πb ≥ 0. The prior probability of success is commonly held to be γ ∈ (0,1).
Net interest rate is assumed to be zero, and all agents’ reservation utilities are also normalized
to zero. Finally, all agents are assumed to be risk neutral, interested only in maximizing
(6) The literature on legal remedies for breach of contracts predicts overinvestment in the presence of expec-
tation damages remedy. See Edlin and Reichelstein (1998).
(7) Some of these studies are Demski and Sappington (1991), Hermalin and Katz (1993), N¨ oldeke and
Schmidt (1995, 1998), Bernheim and Whinston (1998), and Edlin and Hermalin (1998).
(8) See Hart and Moore (1988), Chung (1991), MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), Aghion et al. (1994), and
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996). With the possibility of renegotiation, Che and Hausch (1999) point out the
diﬃculty of overcoming the holdup problem when speciﬁc investment is cooperative in nature.
5expected payoﬀs. Assuming risk neutrality allows us to separate the risk-sharing aspect from
the incentive aspect of optimal contracts. The implication of relaxing this assumption will be
discussed as we go on.
Before the project choice decision is made, managers alone can observe a signal s ∈
[s1,s2] ⊂ R
1 which has a conditional density function f(s|θ) and a conditional distribution
function F(s|θ) for θ = G,B. This signal observation, or information acquisition, is a
primary task of the manager, which incurs private cost c to the manager.(9) One can think of
this cost as a monetary equivalent of the manager’s time and eﬀort in assessing the proﬁtability
of the project. If a manager observed a signal s, we will refer to him as the manager of type
s. Without information acquisition, managers share the same information as the owner, i.e.,
the prior probabilities. Given the signal observation, the marginal density function of signals is
denoted by f(s) = γf(s|G)+(1−γ)f(s|B) and the distribution function by F(s). Posterior
probabilities are then Pr(G|s) =
γf(s|G)
f(s) ≡ p(s), and 1−p(s) =
(1−γ)f(s|B)
f(s) . Thus, p(s) is
the posterior probability of success for the type s manager. All density functions are assumed
to be diﬀerentiable and satisfy the following assumption.




As usual, assumption 1 means that a higher value of signal is more indicative of success.
In particular, it implies that the conditional distribution F(·|G) dominates F(·|B) in the
sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. This assumption leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1: (a) The posterior probability of success is strictly increasing in s, i.e., p0(s) >
0; (b) There exists a unique s∗ ∈ (s1,s2) such that p(s∗) = γ.
The net present value from the project under the prior belief is γπg + (1 − γ)πb − K
(9) We do not model the manager’s or other employees’ eﬀort subsequent to the choice of project. This
simpliﬁcation is justiﬁed on two grounds. First, given other assumptions of our model, incorporating this
type of moral hazard will not change the qualitative results of this paper. For instance, the eﬀort variable
can be introduced in an additively, separable way to the return as, for example, in Rogerson (1997). Second,
we view the main role of managers as that of setting directions based on superior information they possess.
To quote Jensen and Murphy (1990a, p. 251), “Managers often have better information than shareholders
and boards in identifying investment opportunities and assessing the proﬁtability of potential projects; indeed,
the expectation that managers will make superior investment decisions explains why shareholders relinquish
decision rights over their assets by purchasing common stocks”.
6which is assumed to be zero. Thus the owner is not sure whether or not to go ahead with the
project. Given the signal s, the net present value from the project under the posterior belief
is p(s)πg + (1 − p(s))πb − K. By Lemma 1, we have p(s∗) − γ = 0 and p(s) − γ > 0 for
all s > s∗. In the ﬁrst-best world, information acquisition should thus lead to a cutoﬀ rule
for an optimal project choice: undertake the project if and only if s ≥ s∗.
Then what is the value of information? If managers acquire information, the expected net




f(s)[p(s)πg + (1 − p(s))πb − K]ds − c
= γ[1 − F(s∗|G)]πg + (1 − γ)[1 − F(s∗|B)]πb − K[1 − F(s∗)] − c.
(1)
Thus an optimal project choice decision with information acquisition leads to the revision of
success probability from γ to
γ[1−F(s
∗|G)]
1−F(s∗) which is larger than γ since F(s∗) > F(s∗|G)
due to the assumption that F(·|G) stochastically dominates F(·|B). We assume that the
net present value in (1) is positive. Replacing K with γπg +(1−γ)πb and simplifying, this
assumption can be stated as
Assumption 2: γ[F(s∗) − F(s∗|G)]πg + (1 − γ)[F(s∗) − F(s∗|B)]πb > c.
The (LHS) of the above inequality will be called the value of information, denoted by V.
Assumption 2 implies that information is valuable in the ﬁrst-best world where the optimal
project choice decision described above can be implemented. The ﬁrst-best optimum in this
model thus consists of information acquisition and the above optimal project choice decision.
Our primary goal is to see whether a contract that the owner will oﬀer the manager can
implement the ﬁrst-best optimum when the manager’s type is private information.
The time line and the information structure for the model are as follows. At date 0,
the owner randomly selects a manager to oﬀer a contract. At date 1, the chosen manager
decides whether or not to learn his type at private cost of c. At date 2, the manager
makes the project choice decision.(10) If the manager decides to abort the project, then he
(10) Insofar as the manager is the only party who can observe the signal, it does not matter whether the
7is ﬁred at some severance payment according to the initial contract. If the manager decides
to undertake the project, then the remaining terms of initial contract are executed at date
3. Throughout the paper, we assume that the project choice decision (d = 1 if chosen, and
d = 0 otherwise) is observable and veriﬁable, hence can be contracted upon. The return
from the project (r = πg or r = πb) is also assumed observable and veriﬁable in section 4
where return-based contracts are studied. In section 5, we assume that return is observable
but not veriﬁable, hence cannot be contracted upon. The main reason for this is to justify
the use of non-return-based contracts. All other aspects of the model (the manager’s decision
of information acquisition and the signals observed) are private information and cannot be
contracted upon.
4. Optimal Contract When Return is Veriﬁable
Contracts in this section specify compensation to the manager based on the project choice
decision and the return from the project. Thus a return-based contract can be denoted by
a triple (t1,t2,t3) where t1 is the payment if d = 1, r = πg, t2 is if d = 1, r = πb
and t3 is if d = 0. We will focus on contracts that satisfy limited liability (LL), individual
rationality for both agents ((IR-O) for the owner and (IR-M) for the manager), and incentive
compatibility (IC).(11) Before we spell out these constraints, notice that any project choice
decision that will be made by the manager follows a cutoﬀ rule. Suppose the manager chose
the project given a signal s0. Expected compensation from this decision must not be smaller
than that from aborting the project, or p(s0)t1 + (1 − p(s0))t2 ≥ t3. Since p0(s) > 0 by
Lemma 1, any decision rule should thus include an interval [s0,s2] as the range of signal values
at which the project must be undertaken. A project choice decision for which the project is
undertaken for the range of signal values [s,s2] will be simply denoted by [s].
owner makes the project choice decision based on the report made by the manager (i.e., the owner has formal
authority and the manager has real authority in the language of Aghion and Tirole (1997)), or the manager
makes the decision (i.e., the manager has both formal and real authority).
(11) Consider a general mechanism where the owner asks the manager to make a report regarding the observed
signal based on which the owner makes the project choice decision. By the revelation principle, one can restrict
attention to a direct mechanism and truth-telling by the manager if he observed a signal. The conditions
guaranteeing that the manager gathers information and truthfully reports the observed signals can be stated
as incentive compatibility. A slight variation of the argument in Choe (1998) can be used to show that the
revelation principle holds in the current setup.
8Suppose now the owner wants to implement a project choice decision [s0]. Denoting ex
ante expected payoﬀs for the owner and the manager by V0(s0) and U0(s0) respectively, we
have the following limited liability and individual rationality constraints.
(LL) 0 ≤ ti, i = 1,2,3.
(IR-O) V0(s0) ≡
R s2
s0 f(s)[p(s)(πg −t1)+(1−p(s))(πb −t2)−K]ds+
R s
0
s1 f(s)(−t3)ds ≥ 0.
(IR-M) U0(s0) ≡
R s2
s0 f(s)[p(s)t1 + (1 − p(s))t2]ds +
R s
0
s1 t3f(s)ds − c ≥ 0.
For incentive compatibility, we need conditions that lead the manager to choose the deci-
sion [s0] over the following alternatives: (i) always undertake the project without information
acquisition; (ii) always abort the project without information acquisition; (iii) acquire infor-
mation and make a project choice decision other than [s0]; (iv) randomize between (i) and
(ii). As the alternative (iv) is dominated by either (i) or (ii), we need to consider only the ﬁrst
three, which are formally stated below.
(IC-i) U0(s0) ≥ γt1 + (1 − γ)t2.
(IC-ii) U0(s0) ≥ t3.
(IC-iii) U0(s0) ≥
R s2
s f(x)[p(x)t1 + (1 − p(x))t2]dx +
R s
s1 t3f(x)dx − c for all s.
An optimal contract can be identiﬁed in two steps. First, for each project choice decision
[s0], the owner’s problem is to select a contract (t1,t2,t3) to maximize her expected payoﬀ
subject to the above constraints. Once such a contract is identiﬁed for each project choice
decision, then the next step is to ﬁnd a project choice decision that will maximize the owner’s
expected payoﬀ. Thus the owner’s problem is
Maximize(s0, ti≥0, i=1,2,3) V0(s0) subject to (IR-0), (IR-M), (IC-i), (IC-ii), (IC-iii) ∀s0. (2)
The following proposition shows that an optimal contract implements the ﬁrst-best optimal
project choice decision.
9Proposition 1: At the solution to problem (2), the project choice decision is the ﬁrst-best
one, [s∗].
Restricting attention to the project choice decision [s∗], we now simplify (IC-iii) for the
decision [s∗]. It is equivalent to s∗ being a global maximizer of
R s2
s f(x)[p(x)t1 + (1 −
p(x))t2]dx +
R s
s1 t3f(x)dx − c. Due to assumption 1, this constraint can be replaced by the
ﬁrst-order condition for the corresponding optimization problem.
Lemma 2: Suppose (IC-i) and (IC-ii) are satisﬁed for [s∗]. Then (IC-iii) is equivalent
to t3 = γt1 + (1 − γ)t2 and t1 > t2.
That t3 = γt1 + (1 − γ)t2 and t1 > t2 are necessary and suﬃcient for (IC-iii) is
reminiscent of incentive compatibility constraints in adverse selection literature.(12) While
the conditions in Lemma 2 guarantee ex ante incentive compatibility, they also imply that
interim incentive compatibility is satisﬁed for each type of manager. That is, once the signal
is observed, the manager of type s < s∗ does not have incentives to undertake the project.
Otherwise, expected compensation is p(s)t1+(1−p(s))t2 < γt1+(1−γ)t2 = t3, falling short
of the compensation from aborting the project. Similarly, the manager of type s ≥ s∗ does
not have incentives to abort the project.
Substituting t3 = γt1 + (1 − γ)t2 into the expected payoﬀs for the manager and the
owner, and arranging terms yields
U0 = t1γ[1 − F(s∗|G) + F(s∗)] + t2(1 − γ)[1 − F(s∗|B) + F(s∗)] − c, (3)
V0 = V − c − U0 (4)
where V was deﬁned as the value of information. Also, given t3 = γt1 + (1 − γ)t2, (IC-i)
and (IC-ii) are equivalent. Since the owner’s problem is equivalent to minimizing the expected
(12) Given t3 = γt1 + (1 − γ)t2 and t1 > t2, the manager’s expected compensation is increasing in
observed signals if the manager follows the optimal project choice decision. Note the analogy with adverse
selection literature where weak monotonicity of allocation in private types is necessary and suﬃcient for incentive
compatibility under the single-crossing property.
10payment to the manager, (IC-i) will be binding at the solution to problem (2), or t1γ[F(s∗)−
F(s∗|G)] + t2(1 − γ)[F(s∗) − F(s∗|B)] − c = 0. Note also that (IR-M) is satisﬁed whenever
(IC-i) or (IC-ii) are since (LL) precludes negative compensation to the manager. Ignoring
(IR-O) for a moment, the owner’s problem in (2) is then to choose nonnegative values for
(t1,t2) to minimize the expected compensation to the manager given in (3) subject to binding
(IC-i) and t1 > t2. Once the solution to this problem is identiﬁed, t3 can be calculated as
γt1 + (1 − γ)t2.
It is easy to see that, at the solution to the above problem, limited liability for t2 is
binding, i.e., t2 = 0. The intuition is simple. As the manager is risk neutral and πb is a
sign of bad performance which is more likely to be observed if the manager made suboptimal
project choice decisions, incentives for optimal project choice can be best provided by making
the diﬀerence between t1 and t2 as large as possible. This, along with (IC-iii) and binding
(IC-i), leads to t1 = c
γ[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)], t2 = 0, and t3 = c
F(s∗)−F(s∗|G). This contract satisﬁes
(LL) since the stochastic dominance condition implies F(s∗) > F(s∗|G).
One last thing to check is if the above contract satisﬁes (IR-O). Substituting the above








that assumption 2 is not enough to guarantee this inequality. What assumption 2 means is
that information is valuable in the ﬁrst-best world where the owner need not incur incentive
costs to implement an optimum. In the second-best world where providing incentives to the
manager is costly, the cost of information acquisition c should not be too large for (IR-O) to
be satisﬁed. The cost of providing such incentives to the manager increases as the private cost
of information acquisition increases. For the set of contracts satisfying all the constraints to
be nonempty, we thus need an upper bound on c smaller than the value of information.







V so that the set of contracts satisfying
the constraints is not empty. Then an optimal contract is given by t1 = c
γ[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)], t2 =
0, t3 = c
F(s∗)−F(s∗|G).
At an optimal contract, the value of information less the cost of information acquisition is
shared between the owner and the manager: V0 = V − c
F(s∗)−F(s∗|G) −c, U0 = c
F(s∗)−F(s∗|G).
In particular, the manager enjoys strictly positive information rent. The main reason for this is
11limited liability, without which the owner can extract the entire rent by setting t2 a negative
number such that γt1 + (1 − γ)t2 = t3 = 0. Such a contract will satisfy all the incentive
constraints and make (IR-M) binding.
Given the model scenario described before, the contract in Proposition 2 can be interpreted
as a compensation package consisting of a base salary corresponding to t2, a golden parachute
represented by t3, and a bonus given by t1−t2. That the base salary is t2 = 0 is due to risk
neutrality and limited liability. For risk-averse managers, the base salary would be generally
positive. The interpretation of t3 as a golden parachute is justiﬁed by the fact that it is
essentially payment for leaving managers whether the departure has been initiated by hostile
takeover or by the existing board. Its main rationale is to give managers incentives not to
distort the running of the ﬁrm, or the investment decision in the current context, for fear of
replacement by (potentially) better managers.
Proposition 2 leads to a couple of observations: (i) the bonus, golden parachute, and the
manager’s ex ante expected payoﬀs are all increasing in the cost of information acquisition; (ii)
the bonus and golden parachute are positively related. If the cost of information acquisition
is positively related to the size of the ﬁrm, then the ﬁrst observation reconﬁrms the positive
relation between the size of the ﬁrm and executive pay.(13) The second point simply states
that the golden parachute has to reﬂect the opportunity cost of leaving the ﬁrm.
Increasing size of managerial compensation is largely due to stock options or stocks held
by managers (Hall, 1998; Hall and Liebman, 1998). To have a richer theory of optimal man-
agerial contract, it thus seems imperative to have a model that could explain the use of these
instruments. One obvious rationale for using stocks and stock options to motivate managers is
that contracts need not be explicitly based on performance signals. For example, as possible
explanations for a small pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation, Jensen and
Murphy (1990a) contend that performance signals such as accounting earnings can be ma-
nipulated while stock prices may be too noisy a signal for manager’s eﬀort. The possibility
of earnings manipulation by managers seems to have support by many empirical studies in
accounting as well. In the next section, we make an extreme assumption that the return from
the project is not veriﬁable, hence cannot be contracted upon. While this assumption needs
(13) Baker et al. (1988) report that the best documented empirical regularity in this regard is an elasticity of
compensation with respect to ﬁrm sales of about 0.3.
12justiﬁcation, we leave it to readers to resort either to Jensen and Murphy’s explanations, or to
the rationale given in incomplete contracting literature.(14)
5. Optimal Contract When Return Is Not Veriﬁable
When the return from the project is not veriﬁable, contracts can specify compensation to
the manager based only on whether or not the project is undertaken. Nonetheless, the owner
can make compensation indirectly dependent on return since the project choice decision at
date 2 was assumed publicly observable. The observation of project choice leads the market to
revise its belief about the manager’s type, based on which the value of the ﬁrm is determined at
date 2. We assume that the market is rational: the value of the ﬁrm is determined based on the
project choice decision expected by the market, which is conﬁrmed at the equilibrium. Thus
an equilibrium consists of a managerial contract, a project choice decision, and the market’s
valuation rule such that, given the valuation rule, the managerial contract and the project
choice decision are optimal for the owner, and the valuation rule is consistent with the project
choice decision.
This section starts by showing that the owner cannot implement the ﬁrst-best optimum
with contracts that do not rely on the market’s valuation. We will call these simple contracts.
Next we show that this ineﬃciency can be overcome by using contracts that make the man-
ager’s compensation dependent on the market’s valuation. For this, we consider two types of
contracts: contracts with stock ownership for which managerial share trading is restricted to
date 3, and contracts with stock options.
5.1. Ineﬃciency of A Simple Contract
If the return from the project is not veriﬁable, a contract can be represented by a triple
(B0,P,S) where B0 is ﬁxed base salary, P is the payment when the project is aborted,
(14) There are at least two ways incomplete contracting literature justiﬁes the use of incomplete contracts.
The ﬁrst simply assumes intrinsic incompleteness in contracting technologies either due to bounded rationality
or due to transactions costs (for example, Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1995). The second approach endogenizes
incomplete contracts based on strategic ambiguity that, if some aspects of environment cannot be written
into contracts, then there may be gains in leaving some other aspects out of contracts as well (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1998). See also Maskin and Tirole (1999), and Hart and Moore (1999) in the special issue of the
Review of Economic Studies on contracts.
13or a golden parachute, and S is the payment when the project is undertaken. Regardless
of this change in contracting environment, the ﬁrst-best optimum still consists of information
acquisition by the manager and the optimal decision [s∗].
We start this section by showing that a ‘simple’ contract cannot implement the ﬁrst-best
optimum. By a simple contract, we mean a contract for which P and S also represent a ﬁxed
payment. Limited liability imposes nonnegativity constraints on all these components. For a
simple contract to implement the ﬁrst-best optimum, we would need the manager to learn his
type and follow the optimal project choice rule instead of (i) not learning his type and always
aborting the project, (ii) not learning his type and always undertaking the project, and (iii)
learning his type but following a project choice rule diﬀerent from the optimal one.(15) The
ﬁrst two incentive compatibility constraints can be expressed as
(IC-i) U0 ≡ P[1 − F(s∗|B)] + S[1 − F(s∗|G)] + B0 − c ≥ B0 + S,
(IC-ii) U0 ≥ B0 + P.
The third incentive compatibility constraints are now essentially interim incentive compatibility
constraints. Since P and S are ﬁxed, we need only consider two cases: the manager with
type s < s∗ should not have incentives to undertake the project; the manager with type
s ≥ s∗ should not have incentives to abort the project. From these two, we obtain
(IC-iii) P = S.
It is immediate to see that (IC-iii) leads to the violation of (IC-i) and (IC-ii). Simply
put, if managers receive the same payment regardless of project choice decisions (because of
(IC-iii)), then they do not have incentives to learn their types at private cost. Since P is
paid if and only if the project is aborted with the current manager, the only remedy for this
ineﬃciency would be to make the payment represented by S dependent on subsequent return
from the project. However, nonveriﬁability of return precludes the possibility of linking S
directly to return. Indirect ways to link S to return are various arrangements whereby part
of the right to return is transferred to the manager with whom the project is undertaken. In
what follows, we will explore into these possibilities.
(15) Again there is no need to consider randomization over the options (i) and (ii).
145.2. Optimal Contract with Restricted Stock Ownership
This section studies a contract (B0,P,S) where B0 is a ﬁxed base salary,(16) P is a
golden parachute, and S represents a fraction of the value of the ﬁrm awarded to the manager
with whom the project is undertaken, i.e., stock ownership. In accordance with usual practice,
the stock ownership is subject to limited liability. We will consider cases where this ownership
share can be traded either at date 2 or at date 3.
If the ownership share can be traded at and after date 2, what will be the market value
of the ﬁrm? Consider ﬁrst date 3 when the return from the project is realized and publicly
observed. Out of this return, B0 has to be paid to the manager, and K has to be paid to the
owner whenever possible. Since the ownership share represents residual claim, the value of the
ﬁrm will be equal to the value of residual if it is nonnegative, and zero if it is negative. Date 3
value of the ﬁrm is thus V3(r) ≡ max{r−B0 −K, 0} for r = πg, πb. Since πb < K, the
value of the ﬁrm is equal to zero in case of failure, and so we will simply denote the value of
the ﬁrm in case of success as V3. Moreover, at any contract satisfying the owner’s individual
rationality constraint, V3 has to be positive, or B0 < πg − K, since the owner receives
positive payoﬀ only when the return is πg. Therefore we can write the value of the ﬁrm at
date 3 as
V3 ≡ πg − B0 − K. (5)
The value of the ﬁrm at date 2 can be recursively deﬁned. Suppose the market expects
the project choice decision [s0]. At date 2, the announcement of project choice leads the
market to update the probability of success. If the contract (B0,P,S) is incentive-compatible
for the decision [s0], then the market correctly updates the probability of s conditional on




1−F(s0) if s ≥ s0,
and Pr(s|d = 1) = 0, otherwise. As the value of the ﬁrm at date 2 should be equal to the
expected value of the ﬁrm at date 3, the announcement of d = 1 will lead to date 2 value of
the ﬁrm equal to
(16) As there is no discounting, we assume, without loss of generality, that B0 is paid at date 2 to departing










Finally, the initial value of the ﬁrm can be calculated. The announcement of d = 0 at
date 2 leads to the value of the ﬁrm equal to zero, while incentive-compatible contracts will
imply the value of the ﬁrm equal to V2(s0) upon the announcement of d = 1 at date 2.
Again, incentive compatibility implies that the probability of d = 1 is 1 − F(s0). Thus the
initial value of the ﬁrm is
V1(s0) ≡ [1 − F(s0)]V2(s0) = γ[1 − F(s0|G)]V3. (7)
Consider ﬁrst a case where there is no restriction on when to trade ownership share. Unless
the size of golden parachute is suﬃciently large, there is a possibility for managers with types
s < s∗ to misrepresent their types to sell their ownership share at date 2. This puts a lower
bound on the size of golden parachute. On the other hand, the golden parachute cannot be too
large. For otherwise, managers with types s ≥ s∗ may have incentives to deliberately abort
the project. As the next lemma shows, these two restrictions on the size of golden parachute
lead to the ineﬃciency of contracts with unrestricted stock ownership.
Lemma 3: A contract (B0,P,S) where S is the ownership share tradeable either
at date 2 or at date 3 is not incentive compatible for the project choice decision [s∗], hence
cannot implement the ﬁrst-best optimum.
As unrestricted stock ownership as in Lemma 3 cannot implement the ﬁrst-best optimum,
it seems natural to consider some form of restriction on when managers can trade their owner-
ship share. Suppose the ownership share can be traded only at date 2. Intuitively, this should
not improve on the simple contract examined in the previous subsection. If the ownership share
can be traded only at date 2 and if the contract is to be incentive compatible for all types,
then the expected compensation at date 2 has to be the same for all types of managers when
they make project choice decisions based on their true types. This is precisely as in the case of
a simple contract where the main reason for ineﬃciency is the inability of the owner to reward
16‘better’ managers more favorably. Thus a contract with stock ownership which is restricted to
be traded before the realization of return cannot implement the ﬁrst-best optimum.
Lemma 4: A contract (B0,P,S) where S is the ownership share tradeable only at
date 2 is not incentive compatible for the project choice decision [s∗], hence cannot implement
the ﬁrst-best optimum.
What causes the ineﬃciency in Lemmas 3 and 4? Essentially it stems from stringent
interim incentive compatibility constraints, mainly due to the incentives of managers with
types s < s∗ to misrepresent their types for an immediate sale of their stock ownership at
date 2. A logical remedy for this ineﬃciency would then be a restriction on managers’ share
trade at date 2. The ﬁnal case to study is thus contracts for which ownership share can be
traded only at date 3.(17) At date 3, the return from the project is publicly observed and
correctly reﬂected in the value of the ﬁrm, implying that ‘better’ managers will expect higher
expected compensation at date 2. Indeed, a contract with stock ownership that is restricted
to be traded only at date 3 can implement the ﬁrst-best optimum. Moreover, an argument
similar to what was used to prove Proposition 1 can be applied to show that an optimal
contract implements the ﬁrst-best optimum.
Proposition 3: An optimal contract with stock ownership is given by (B0,P,S) such
that B0 = 0, P = c
F(s∗)−F(s∗|G), S = c
γ(πg−K)[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)] where S represents the
manager’s stock ownership restricted to be traded only at date 3.
The contract in Proposition 3 will be called a contract with restricted stock ownership,
in contrast to the contract in section 3, which will be called a bonus contract. Note that the
size of golden parachute is the same under both contracts. As both contracts implement the
ﬁrst-best optimum, they are not Pareto-comparable. Indeed, it is easy to show that the sum
of ex ante expected payoﬀs for the manager and the owner is equal to the value of information
less the cost of information acquisition in both contracts. Then which contract should be
preferred by the owner, or by the manager? One might wonder if the contract with restricted
(17) For a sample of 371 Fortune 500 ﬁrms in 1980, Kole (1997) reports that the average wait to vest executive
stock awards was 28.7 months.
17stock ownership should be disadvantageous to the owner because of her inability to condition
managerial compensation on return. However, this turns out not to be the case.
Proposition 4: The optimal bonus contract and the optimal contract with restricted
stock ownership are strongly payoﬀ-equivalent. That is, the distribution of managers’ (owner’s,
resp.) ex post payoﬀs under the bonus contract is the same as the distribution of managers’
(owner’s, resp.) ex post payoﬀs under the contract with restricted stock ownership.
The proof of Proposition 4 is immediate upon comparing the two optimal contracts. First,
straightforward algebra shows that the sum of ex ante expected payoﬀs for the manager and
the owner under the contract with restricted stock ownership is equal to the net value of
information: V − c. This was also the case with the bonus contract. Second, the size of
golden parachute is the same in both contracts. Finally, it is easy to see that the ex post value
of manager’s stock ownership given by SV3 is equal to the ex post value of the manager’s
bonus given by t2.
Proposition 4 points to an important direction in designing optimal managerial contract.
For reasons to favor one form of contract over another, managers’ risk aversion alone is not a
good place to look at. As long as the owner knows the distribution of return, and as long as the
set of incentive-compatible contracts is not empty, the owner can replicate exactly the same
distribution of payoﬀs for managers using either bonus or restricted stock ownership. This can
be done by setting t1 = SV3 +B0, t2 = B0, and t3 = P +B0, leaving risk-averse managers
indiﬀerent between the two types of contracts. Of course, an optimal contract in this case will
generally have t2 = B0 > 0. However, managers’ risk aversion combined with other elements
such as the possibility of earnings manipulation or the information content of earnings could
change the payoﬀ-equivalence result. As discussed in the introduction, this has been a focus
of numerous studies in accounting.
5.3. Optimal Contract with Stock Options
When return is not veriﬁable, yet another way of linking executive compensation to per-
formance is using stock options, which is the focus of this section. Speciﬁcally, we study a
18contract (B0,P,σ,X) where B0 and P are the same as before, and σ is the fraction of the
value of the ﬁrm which the manager can buy either at date 2 or at date 3 at an exercise price
given by X. In other words, σ represents (American-type) call options on stocks awarded
to the manager at date 0. When one thinks of stock ownership equivalent to stock options with
zero exercise price, the discussions in the previous section should make it clear that restricting
the exercise of options to date 2 cannot be incentive compatible for the ﬁrst-best project choice
decision.
As the size of option grant (σ) can be traded oﬀ against the exercise price (X), one cannot
in general derive a unique optimal contract with stock options. That is, the same incentives
can be provided by diﬀerent combinations of (σ,X). When options can be exercised either
at date 2 or at date 3, however, incentive compatibility puts a lower bound on the exercise
price. If the exercise price is too low, then managers may be tempted to undertake the project
for an immediate exercise of options even when the project has negative expected return.
On the other hand, the exercise price cannot be larger than the date 3 value of the project.
Otherwise, options are always out of the money and so managers will not have incentives to
gather information.
Lemma 5: A contract with stock options (B0,P,σ,X) is incentive compatible for the






The above lemma illustrates the nature of trade-oﬀ between the size of option grant and
exercise price. Managers can choose either a risky project for possible increase in the value of
their options, or a safer alternative. For an increase in the exercise price, the necessary upward
adjustment in the size of option grant should thus reﬂect the opportunity cost of managers’
risk taking. Other things equal, the factors that reduce the exercise date value of the ﬁrm
without changing managers’ incentives should require a downward adjustment in the exercise
price. For example, if the ﬁrm has outstanding debt to be repaid at date 3, then the exercise
price of managerial options should decrease in the amount of debt.(18) This point can be used
(18) In this case, one can think of V3 as the value of equity rather than the value of the ﬁrm. Garvey and
Mawani (1999) provide empirical evidence for this.
19in characterizing the optimal contract with stock options. As is clear from the above lemma,
the base salary reduces the date 3 value of the ﬁrm without having any incentive eﬀect. A
larger base salary will thus require a lower exercise price or a larger grant size, increasing
the owner’s costs of providing incentives to managers. It follows then that, at any optimal
contract, the base salary should be set equal to zero. Also it can be shown that an optimal
contract implements the ﬁrst-best project choice decision.
Proposition 5: An optimal contract with stock options is given by B0 = 0, P =
c




1−γ ≤ X ≤ V3.
The contract with stock options (Proposition 5) diﬀers from the contract with restricted
stock ownership (Proposition 3) in that options can be exercised either at date 2 or at date 3.
This ﬂexibility managers enjoy can be countered by the choice of exercise price by the owner.
As shown in Lemma 5, a zero exercise price cannot be incentive compatible if options can be
exercised at either date. Thus, for the contract with restricted stock ownership, managers’
share trading needs to be restricted to date 3. Other than that, both types of contracts can
provide exactly the same incentives. First, as both contracts implement the ﬁrst-best optimum,
they are not Pareto-comparable. In fact, it is a matter of simple calculation to show that the
contract with stock options again leads to the sum of ex ante expected payoﬀs for the manager
and the owner equal to the net value of information: V − c. Second, note that the size of
golden parachute is the same in both contracts. Moreover, it is easy to see that the ex post
value of manager’s stock ownership given by SV3 is equal to the ex post value of manager’s
stock options given by σ(V3 − X). This again establishes the payoﬀ-equivalence of the two
contractual forms.
Proposition 6: The optimal contract with stock options and the optimal contract
with restricted stock ownership are strongly payoﬀ-equivalent. That is, the distribution of
managers’ (owner’s, resp.) ex post payoﬀs under the contract with stock options is the same
as the distribution of managers’ (owner’s, resp.) ex post payoﬀs under the contract with
restricted stock ownership.
206. Summary and Discussions
This paper has studied an optimal contract for executives in two contracting environments.
When contracts can be based on earnings, an optimal contract is shown to be a combination
of base salary, golden parachute and bonus. If earnings are not veriﬁable, two types of optimal
contracts were studied: a contract with restricted stock ownership, and a contract with stock
options. Three main conclusions could be drawn. First, various components comprising a
compensation package are interdependent. Second, the size of golden parachute is the same
regardless of diﬀerent contractual forms. Third and most importantly, these three types of
optimal contracts are all payoﬀ-equivalent in a strong sense: agents’ ex ante and ex post
payoﬀs are exactly the same under all three contracts.
Perhaps in retrospect, it may not be surprising that a highly simpliﬁed model as in this
paper should lead to the payoﬀ equivalence results. It thus seems imperative to have discussions
on how the equivalence results are likely to change in a more realistic setting. At times, it
has been discussed how the nature of contracts will change if there are possibilities of earnings
manipulation by managers. The change, of course, will depend on the extent to which the
information content of earnings report is reﬂected in stock prices. For example, if there is
signiﬁcant room for earnings manipulation and if markets do not take earnings information
fully into account, then compensation based on stocks or stock options would be a better
alternative than earnings-based bonus. The cost of using stock-based incentives is that of risk-
bearing by managers when they are risk averse. While we admit that earnings manipulation
is not driven simply by managers’ individual motives, such a possibility together with the
information content of earnings report do seem to be an important element to take into account
when asking the question about the relevance of contractual forms.
Other elements that need mentioning are managers’ risk aversion, concern for reputation,
private beneﬁts of control, and the complexity of corporate hierarchy where good performance
is often the result of consonant eﬀorts by all those involved including the whim of nature. Risk
aversion alone has been shown not to be a good explanation for the use of diﬀerent forms of
contracts since all three types of optimal contracts derived in this paper are payoﬀ-equivalent
in a strong sense. The next two do not seem to cause signiﬁcant changes to the main conclusion
21of this paper. For example, suppose the manager enjoys some private beneﬁts of control when
the project is undertaken under his tenure, which leaving managers at date 2 will lose. Such
private beneﬁts of control increase the incentives of managers to stay in the oﬃce by making,
if necessary, suboptimal decisions. All that is needed to defeat these incentives is to increase
the size of severance payment. The simplest, albeit ad hoc, way of thinking about managers’
concern for reputation would be similar to how private beneﬁts of control are introduced -
leaving managers at date 2 incur private costs from loss of reputation. This again makes the
departure more costly than otherwise, necessitating a larger severance payment. Neither of
these are likely to change the other components of contracts.(19)
The complexity of corporate hierarchy does seem to be an important element that could
bring about changes to the irrelevance result of this paper. Two of the most important roles
executives of corporation are expected to play are setting directions - which was the main
focus of this paper - and supervising employees on behalf of shareholders, the latter including
the design of employment contracts for, and the monitoring of employees. The more complex
corporate hierarchy becomes, the more onerous it is to perform the second role, and the more
diﬃcult it gets to predict performance. Again, risk aversion may then be an important factor
to consider, which may call for the need to protect executives from risk and to motivate them to
specialize in the role of direction setting while delegating supervisory role down the corporate
hierarchy. In this case, compensation based on stock options could be a more attractive
alternative than that based on stocks or earnings information.(20)
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (a) follows directly from the monotone likelihood ratio condition. For
(b), note ﬁrst that there is an s ∈ (s1,s2) such that f(s|G) = f(s|B) since f(s|G) and
(19) For example, consider a modiﬁcation to the model in section 2 that the manager under whom the project
is undertaken enjoys some private beneﬁts equal to φ. It can be shown that, at an optimal contract, only t3
(as well as P) changes to φ + c
F(s∗)−F(s∗|G). Therefore the equivalence results of the paper remain intact.
(20) some also attribute the increasing use of stock options in the US to a favorable tax and accounting
treatment of these instruments (Murphy, 1999). Empirical evidence is mixed. Yermack (1995), and Hall and
Liebman (2000) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of tax and accounting considerations on the use of executive stock options
is not signiﬁcant in the US, while Klassen and Mawani (1999) report a positive correlation between the two in
Canada.
22f(s|B) are density functions. The monotone likelihood ratio condition guarantees that such an
s is unique, which is denoted by s∗. It then follows that f(s∗) = γf(s∗|G)+(1−γ)f(s∗|B) =
f(s∗|G), hence p(s∗) = γ.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose the owner wants to implement the project choice decision
[s0]. Then the manager’s ex ante expected payoﬀ from following this decision with information
gathering is
U0(s0) ≡ γ[1 − F(s0|G)]t1 + (1 − γ)[1 − F(s0|B)]t2 + F(s0)t3 − c.
The ﬁrst-order condition for (IC-iii) for the decision [s0] is given by
∂U0(s
0)
∂s = 0 which






f(s0) t2. That is, t3 is a weighted average of t1 and t2
when (IC-iii) is satisﬁed. Moreover, from the owner’s problem of maximizing V0(s0) subject



















f(s0) t1 > 0, remaining conditions to check are (IC-I): U0(s0) ≥ γt1, and (IC-ii):
U0(s0) ≥ t3 since (IR-M) is satisﬁed whenever incentive compatibility constraints are. These
conditions can be checked in two cases.
Suppose ﬁrst s0 ≥ s∗. Then t3 =
γf(s
0|G)




f(s0) is increasing in s0 and
f(s
∗|G)
f(s∗) = 1. Thus if (IC-ii) is satisﬁed,
then so will be (IC-i). In view of the owner’s optimization problem, it is clear that (IC-ii) will








simple calculation shows that the owner’s ex ante expected payoﬀ is V0(s0) = V(s0)−c−U0(s0)
where V(s0) is the value of information for the project choice decision [s0]. Noting that [s∗]
is the ﬁrst-best decision, it is easy to see that V(s0) is maximized when s0 = s∗. Moreover,
diﬀerentiating U0(s0) with respect to s0 and using the monotone likelihood ratio condition,
one can show that U0(s0) is increasing in s0 for s0 ≥ s∗. Thus, for all s0 ≥ s∗, V0(s0) is
maximized when s0 = s∗.
23Suppose now s0 < s∗. Then t3 < γt1 and only (IC-i) will be binding at the solution
to the owner’s problem. This leads us to t1 =
cf(s
0)
γf(s0|G)F(s0)−γf(s0)F(s0|G) and U0(s0) = γt1.
The owner’s ex ante expected payoﬀ is again V0(s0) = V(s0) − c − U0(s0) and the monotone
likelihood ratio condition shows that U0(s0) is decreasing in s0 for all s0 < s∗. Thus, for
all s0 < s∗, V0(s0) is maximized when s0 = s∗.





s1 t3f(x)dx−c is U0(s∗) = −t1γf(s∗|G)−t2(1−γ)






f(s∗) t2 = γt1+(1−γ)t2 where the second
equality follows from f(s∗) = f(s∗|G) = f(s∗|B). Given t3 = γt1 + (1 − γ)t2, the second
derivative of the objective function becomes
U00(s) = −t1γf0(s|G) − t2(1 − γ)f0(s|B) + t3f0(s)
= −t1γf0(s|G) − t2(1 − γ)f0(s|B) + [γt1 + (1 − γ)t2]f0(s)
= γt1[f0(s) − f0(s|G)] + (1 − γ)t2[f0(s) − f0(s|B)]
= γ(1 − γ)(t1 − t2)[f0(s|B) − f0(s|G)].






f(s|B) for all s, which
implies f0(s∗|G) > f0(s∗|B) since f(s∗|G) = f(s∗|B) by the deﬁnition of s∗. Thus
t1 > t2 guarantees the second-order suﬃcient condition for s∗ being a local maximizer of
U(s), or U00(s∗) < 0. To prove that s∗ is the global maximizer of U(s), it remains to show
U(s∗) = U0 ≥ max {U(s1), U(s2)}. But U(s1) = γt1 +(1−γ)t2 −c and U(s2) = t3 −c.
Therefore, given (IC-i) and (IC-ii), we must have U(s∗) = U0 ≥ max {U(s1), U(s2)}.
Proof of Lemma 3: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose (B0,P,S) implements the
ﬁrst-best optimum, hence incentive compatible for the decision [s∗]. Then the value of
the ﬁrm evolves to V2(s∗) and V3. Consider interim incentive compatibility constraints.
Managers with types s < s∗ face three options: abort the project and receive P + B0;
undertake the project and trade their shares at date 2, receiving SV2(s∗)+B0; undertake the
project and trade their shares at date 3, receiving Sp(s)V3 +B0. Note that selling a fraction
of S at date 2 and the rest at date 3 is dominated by either of the second or third options.
Thus interim incentive compatibility for managers with types s < s∗ can be written as
24P + B0 ≥ sup {SV2(s∗) + B0, Sp(s)V3 + B0 : s < s∗} = SV2(s∗) + B0






γV3 > γV3 > p(s)V3 for all s < s∗.
Therefore we have P ≥ SV2(s∗).
Managers with types s ≥ s∗ also face three options: abort the project and receive P+B0;
undertake the project and trade their shares at date 2, receiving SV2(s∗)+B0; undertake the
project and trade their shares at date 3, receiving Sp(s)V3+B0. Again it is not necessary to
consider a fractional share trade. Type s ≥ s∗ managers will undertake the project as long
as the expected payoﬀ from selling stocks at either date is not smaller than P +B0. As this
has to be true for all s ≥ s∗, interim incentive compatibility for managers with types s ≥ s∗
can be written as
P + B0 ≤ min

max{SV2(s∗) + B0, Sp(s)V3 + B0} : s ≥ s∗	
= SV2(s∗) + B0.
The two incentive compatibility constraints boil down to P = SV2(s∗). But then, as in
simple contracts, managers do not have incentives to acquire information at private cost since
the ex ante incentive compatibility constraint is violated.
Proof of Lemma 4: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose (B0,P,S) implements
the ﬁrst-best optimum, hence incentive compatible for [s∗]. If managers learn and make
project choice decisions based on their true types, the ex ante expected payoﬀ is given by
U0 ≡ SV2(s∗)[1 − F(s∗)] + PF(s∗) + B0 − c. For ex ante incentive compatibility to be satis-
ﬁed, U0 should not be smaller than P + B0, the expected payoﬀ from always aborting the
project without information acquisition, and SV2(s∗)+B0, the expected payoﬀ from always
undertaking the project without information acquisition. Consider now interim incentive com-
patibility: managers with type s < s∗ should not have incentives to undertake the project;
managers with type s ≥ s∗ should not have incentives to abort the project. It is easy to see
that interim incentive compatibility boils down to SV2(s∗) + B0 = P + B0, which leads to
the violation of the ex ante incentive compatibility constraint.
25Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose (B0,P,S) is a contract where S represents the man-
ager’s stock ownership restricted to be traded only at date 3. For this contract to implement
the ﬁrst-best optimum, it has to be incentive compatible for the decision [s∗]. If managers
gather information and follow the optimal project choice decision based on their true types,








f(s)ds + B0 − c
= Sγ[1 − F(s∗|G)]V3 + PF(s∗) + B0 − c.
For the ex ante incentive compatibility to be satisﬁed, U0 should not be smaller than P +B0,
the expected payoﬀ from always aborting the project without information acquisition, and
SγV3 + B0, the expected payoﬀ from always undertaking the project without information
acquisition.
Consider now interim incentive compatibility constraints: managers with type s < s∗
should not have incentives to undertake the project; managers with type s ≥ s∗ should not
have incentives to abort the project. The ﬁrst leads to P + B0 ≥ SγV3 + B0. The second
interim incentive compatibility constraints are equivalent to Sp(s)V3 + B0 ≥ P + B0 for all
s ≥ s∗. As the (LHS) of this inequality increases in s, it is suﬃcient to have the inequality
hold when s = s∗, which leads to SγV3+B0 ≥ P +B0. Thus interim incentive compatibility
boils down to SγV3 + B0 = P + B0, or P = SγV3. Substituting this into the ex ante
incentive compatibility constraint and simplifying, we have S ≥ c
γV3[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)].
We now turn to the owner’s optimization problem. The owner provides K for the project
at date 2 if d = 1, and pays B0+P to the manager if d = 0. At date 3, if the return is πg,
then the owner recovers K, pays B0 to the manager, and receives the residual (1 − S)V3.
If the return is πb, then K cannot be recovered, and so the owner receives πb and pays














= γ[1 − F(s∗|G)](1 − S)V3 + (1 − γ)[1 − F(s∗|B)](πb − K) − PF(s∗) − B0.
26The owner’s problem is then to choose (B0 ≥ 0, P ≥ 0, S ∈ [0,1]) to maximize V0
subject to P = SγV3 and S ≥ c
γV3[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)]. Substituting P = SγV3 into V0 and
diﬀerentiating with respect to B0 leads to −γ(1−S)[1−F(s∗|G)]−1 which is negative for
all S ∈ [0,1]. Thus B0 = 0 and so V3 = πg − K. The derivative of V0 with respect to
S is also negative, implying that the constraint S ≥ c
γV3[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)] has to be binding at
the solution. Finally, P is found by replacing S = c
γ(πg−K)[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)] and B0 = 0 into
P = SγV3, leading to P = c
F(s∗)−F(s∗|G).
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider ﬁrst the interim incentive compatibility constraints. At
date 2, managers with types s < s∗ face three alternatives: abort the project and receive
B0 + P; choose the project and exercise options at date 2, receiving σ(V2(s∗) − X)+ + B0;
choose the project and wait until date 3 for the exercise of options, with expected payoﬀ of
p(s)σ(V3 −X)+ +B0. Here (φ)+ denotes the nonnegative part of φ. Note that exercising
a fraction of σ at date 2 and the rest at date 3 is dominated by either of the second or third
alternatives. Using Lemma 1, interim incentive compatibility constraints for managers with
types s < s∗ can then be written as
P + B0 ≥ sup

σ(V2(s∗) − X)+ + B0, p(s)σ(V3 − X)+ + B0 : s < s∗	
= max

σ(V2(s∗) − X)+ + B0, γσ(V3 − X)+ + B0
	
.
Consider now managers with types s ≥ s∗. They will correctly choose the project as long
as the expected payoﬀ from exercising options at either date is larger than that from aborting
the project. As this has to be true for all s ≥ s∗, interim incentive compatibility constraints
become
P + B0 ≤ min

max{ σ(V2(s∗) − X)+ + B0, p(s)σ(V3 − X)+ + B0 } : s ≥ s∗ 	
= max { σ(V2(s∗) − X)+ + B0, γσ(V3 − X)+ + B0 }.
Thus interim incentive compatibility constraints can be satisﬁed for all types of managers if
and only if P = max { σ(V2(s∗) − X)+, γσ(V3 − X)+ }. Deﬁne Xl ≡=
V2(s
∗)−γV3
1−γ . It is
easy to see Xl ≤ V2(s∗) and X
≥
<Xl if and only if γσ(V3 − X)+ ≥
< σ(V2(s∗) − X)+.
27Incentive compatibility can now be analyzed in several cases. Suppose ﬁrst X < Xl.
Then all options will be exercised at date 2 leading to the interim incentive compatibility,
P = σ(V2(s∗) − X). Then managers’ ex ante expected payoﬀ from gathering informa-
tion and implementing the optimal investment policy is U0 =
R s2




s1 f(s)ds + B0 − c = P + B0 − c. But this is smaller than the payoﬀ from always
aborting the project without information gathering. Thus X < Xl does not satisfy the
ex ante incentive compatibility. Suppose next Xl ≤ X ≤ V3. As Xl ≤ X implies
γσ(V3 − X)+ ≥ σ(V2(s∗) − X)+, all options are exercise at date 3 leading to the in-
terim incentive compatibility P = γσ(V3 − X). Given this, managers’ ex ante expected






s1 f(s)ds+B0−c = γσ(V3−X)[1+F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)]+B0−c.
To satisfy the ex ante incentive compatibility, U0 should not be smaller than P + B0, the
payoﬀ from always aborting the project without information gathering, and γσ(V3−X)+B0,
the expected payoﬀ from always choosing the project without information gathering. But these
two are the same if interim incentive compatibility is satisﬁed. Thus, for the ex ante incentive
compatibility, we need γσ(V3 − X)[1 + F(s∗) − F(s∗|G)] + B0 − c ≥ γσ(V3 − X) + B0 or
σ ≥ c
γ(V3−X)[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)]. Finally, if X > V3 then options are always out of the money,
and so managers do not have incentives to gather information.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the owner’s optimization problem in implementing the
decision [s∗]. The owner provides K for the project at date 2 if d = 1, and pays B0 + P
to the manager if d = 0. In case of success at date 3, the owner receives πg, and pays
σ(V3 − X) + B0 to the manager as options will be exercised against her. If the return is πb,
then the owner receives πb and pays only B0 to the manager as options will then be under








πg − K − σ(V3 − X)








= γ[1 − F(s∗|G)][πg − K − σ(V3 − X)] + (1 − γ)[1 − F(s∗|B)](πb − K) − PF(s∗) − B0.
Substituting P into V0 using Lemma 5, the owner’s problem is to choose (B0, σ, X)
to maximize V0 subject to incentive compatibility. Diﬀerentiating V0 with respect to
28B0, we obtain ∂V0
∂B0 = σ[γ(1 − F(s∗|G)) + F(s∗)] − 1 < 0 for all σ ∈ [0,1] since
γ(1 − F(s∗|G)) + F(s∗) < 1. Thus limited liability for B0 has to be binding, or B0 = 0.
Next diﬀerentiating V0 with respect to σ for a given value of X gives us ∂V0
∂σ = −γ(V3 −
X)[1 − F(s∗|G) + F(s∗)] < 0. Thus the incentive compatibility σ ≥ c
γ(V3−X)[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)]
must be binding, leading us to σ = c
γ(V3−X)[F(s∗)−F(s∗|G)].
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